In a major move on Friday, the Supreme Court of Nigeria struck down a deeply troubling litigation tactic that threatened the very foundation of fair hearing in Nigeria’s justice system.
At the centre of the controversy was an extraordinary and dangerous proposition: that a plaintiff, having instituted an action for debt recovery, could, through a receiver appointed at his own instance—also determine the legal representation of the defendant in that same action.
In effect, the plaintiff /claimant would control both the prosecution and the defence. This is the implication of the January 13, 2026 decision of the Court of Appeal by Justice Yargata Nimpar, Justice Polycarp Terna Kwahar, and Justice Danlami Zama Senchi.
By disqualifying the legal counsels that were properly appointed by Neconde and Nestoil, and by recognising that a challenged receiver was the sole authority competent to appoint legal counsel for the companies in a dispute where the appointment of the receiver was under judicial scrutiny, the Court of Appeal erroneously struck at the heart of Constitutional Right to Fair Hearing enshrined in Section 36 of the Nigerian Constitution. This was not merely a procedural irregularity; it was a fundamental assault on justice.
The Supreme Court specifically faulted the Court of Appeal’s January 13, 2026 decision, which had disqualified Chief Wole Olanipekun SAN and Dr Muiz Banire SAN that Neconde and Nestoil appointed as their counsel, and recognised the receiver as the sole authority competent to appoint counsel for the companies.
Describing that position as erroneous, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal failed to appreciate the conflict inherent in allowing a receiver, whose appointment was under judicial scrutiny, to control the company’s legal representation.
In a unanimous judgement read by Justice Mohammed Baba Idris, the five-member apex court panel held that where the legality of a receiver’s appointment was itself in dispute, such a receiver could not assume the authority to appoint counsel to represent the company in the same proceedings.
Justice Idris stated that the questions submitted by the lenders before the trial court sought judicial interpretation on critical issues, including whether the lenders were entitled to enforce security, appoint a receiver, and whether the receiver could lawfully exercise powers under that appointment.
According to the Supreme Court, these questions strike at the “very foundation” of the receivership, rather than relating to routine management or realisation of assets.
“It would occasion a conflict of interest,” the court held, “for a receiver appointed by parties whose rights are being challenged to also determine the legal representation of the company in the same proceedings.”
The apex court emphasised that the receiver’s authority was derived from the very transaction under challenge, making it improper for such a receiver to control the company’s legal defence in a suit questioning that authority.
Legal analysts, hailing the decision of the apex court, concurred that an arrangement under which a challenged/disputed receiver was allowed to control a company’s legal defence, offended the core principle of adversarial litigation, where each party was entitled to independently present its case through counsel of their own choosing.
It is also an attack on the constitutional right to fair hearing under Section 36, which guarantees every litigant the freedom to select legal representation without interference.
The overturning of the erroneous Court of Appeal judgement by the Supreme Court, in effect, amounts to a firm rejection of the notion that receivership can be weaponised to silence opposition or predetermine outcomes.
The apex court’s stance makes it clear that no party—no matter how strategically positioned—can appropriate the legal voice of its adversary.
The ruling restores a critical balance. It reaffirms that receivers, even where validly appointed, cannot be used as instruments of procedural domination, nor can statutory mechanisms override constitutional protections.
More importantly, it sends a powerful message to litigants and lower courts alike: the machinery of justice must never be manipulated into a tool of oppression.
In defending the independence of legal representation, the Supreme Court has corrected a grave injustice.